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Abstract 
This paper explores the relevance of soft budget constraints (SBC) to development studies by 
examining the parastatal sector. The political ingredient of the SBC is discussed by focusing 
on two examples: 1) religious and military foundations in Iran; and 2) Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac. It presents two main findings. First, the SBC of the parastatal sector can be 
understood as the political economy of a predator state or state’s rent-seeking activity. 
Second, the state sector is more prone to the SBC compared with a decentralized competitive 
market, but it might be subject to a harder budget constraint in comparison with the 
parastatal sector.  
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Soft Budget Constraint and the Parastatal Sector 
Mehrdad Vahabi (University of Paris 8) 
1. Introduction 
The soft budget constraint (SBC), initially conceptualised by Janos Kornai (1979, 1980, 1986, 
1998a,b), describes the attitude of firms within a socialist economy where a paternalist state 
never lets any firm go bankrupt and always bails out a loss-making firm. Kornai provided an 
exogenous or Institutionalist theory of the SBC, according to which the cause of the softness 
is not explained by the internal interests of the softening institution (namely the state), 
because the state is assumed to be paternalist and not predatory1. Since Kornai’s pioneering 
work, a vast body of formal literature has been published about the SBC, offering an 
endogenous explanation of the phenomenon.  
The term ‘endogenous explanation’ means an analysis of the SBC as an outcome of the 
internal interests of the softening institution (the state or another organization playing the role 
of Principal). From this perspective, the degree of budget constraint is a matter of strategic 
behaviour of rational maximizing agents. Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) conducted 
pioneering work in this field, arguing that the SBC syndrome pertains wherever a funding 
source, for example, a bank or government, finds it impossible to keep an enterprise to its 
fiscal budget, i.e., whenever the enterprise can exact ex post a bigger subsidy or loan than 
                                                             
1 The distinction between “predatory” (dominating) and “paternalist” power is clearly acknowledged by many 
authors. For example, Wartenberg (1990) distinguishes between domination and beneficent power. According to 
him, one instance of such power is paternalism, as in legislation requiring the wearing of seat-belts, where A, 
seeking to avert harm or promote some benefit to B, may act against B’s current wants or preferences, thereby 
limiting B’s freedom to act. For Wartenberg, this type of power is different from other types of beneficent power 
which he dubs “transformative”. He provides different illustrations of “transformative” power such as mothering, 
apprenticeship, teaching, parenting, and therapy. For a detailed discussion of “paternalism” and its difference 
with “predatory” or dominating power see Lukes, 2005, pp. 84-95.  
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would have been considered efficient ex ante. In this sense, the SBC problem extends well 
beyond socialist economies, because the extent to which loss-making firms or projects are 
terminated or refinanced is also very relevant in developed, emerging, or developing capitalist 
economies (Maskin, 2006). 
Eminent representatives of the two Institutionalist (exogenous) and formal (endogenous) 
branches of the SBC literature advocate a unified theoretical framework (Kornai, Maskin and 
Roland, 2003). The unified framework predicts the softening of budget constraints due to 
asymmetrical information between the Centre (Principal) and Agent, and time inconsistency. 
Time inconsistency of the Centre lies at the heart of the SBC syndrome: if the Centre were 
able to commit credibly not to subsidise the firm ex post, the firm would make more efficient 
ex ante decisions. Accordingly, Kornai’s exogenous explanation of the SBC as a result of 
state paternalism becomes a specific case of time inconsistency and a lack of credible 
commitment.  
The theoretical justification for the unified framework is open to discussion. Tensions 
between the exogenous and endogenous explanations of the SBC notwithstanding (Vahabi, 
2011b), the two branches share at least two commonalities. First, analysis of the SBC is 
conducted within a dichotomous vision of the state versus private sector. Second, a pure 
decentralized market economy is considered to be a benchmark of the hard budget constraint 
(HBC) and efficiency. Consequently, nationalization tends to soften the budget constraint 
whereas privatisation and decentralization tend to harden the budget constraint. 
The practical implication of this result was extremely important for both the developing 
countries experiencing the post-socialist transition and those embarking on macroeconomic 
adjustment and structural reforms during the last two decades.  
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The SBC was particularly pressing in Romania, Russian Federation, China, Albania, 
Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Belarus, etc. (Kornai, 2001; Li, 2008). Five main groups of 
instruments which led to the SBC in the post-socialist transition were: 1) fiscal subsidy; 2) 
soft taxation; 3) soft bank credit (non-performing loans); 4) soft trade credit (the accumulation 
of trade arrears between firms); 5) wage arrears. The Washington consensus held that the 
‘Holy Trinity’ of liberalization, privatisation and stabilization would suffice to produce an 
efficient market. The advocates of the SBC theory emphatically argued that the hardening of 
the budget constraint should be given equal priority with these.  
Many empirical studies demonstrate the existence and deleterious effect of the SBC syndrome 
in the public sectors of non-socialist developing countries (Kornai, Maskin and Roland, 2003, 
pp. 1129-1130). The relevance of the hardening of the budget constraint was also highlighted 
theoretically for all the developing countries by many authors (Raiser, 1994; Anderson, 1995) 
and decision makers in international institutions (World Bank 1997, 1999; EBRD 2000, 
2001). A considerable degree of government intervention in many developing countries, the 
particular importance of parastatals in industrial production, and the explicit goal of 
improving the working of markets during structural adjustment made Kornai’s hypothesis a 
useful background against which the success or failure of many economic reforms could be 
studied.   
Interestingly enough, the SBC was maintained in many developing countries which adopted 
structural and adjustment reforms and introduced a privatisation policy. However, the 
“privatisation” was nothing but the transfer of property rights to the parastatal sector which 
often was controlled by the military or religious elites. One salient illustration is the Islamic 
Republic of Iran.  
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The ‘Adjustment Program’ and the ‘Stabilization Program’ were initially introduced as the 
first and second quadrennial programs during the two periods of presidency of Ali Akbar 
Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989-1997). The two programs contained a “privatisation” policy. 
Accordingly, the fourth Majlis (1992-1996) of the Islamic Republic of Iran passed a law in 
1994 authorizing the government to sell the state enterprises in different ways. The law 
stipulates that Isargaran (sacrificers), namely those who devoted themselves to the war, 
prisoners of war, and relatives and members of those who were killed in the war have the 
priority to own privatised enterprises. In this way, the ‘privatisation’ trend consists in 
transferring state enterprises to the religious Foundations (Bonyads) or to the parastatal sector 
(Adeli, 2004, pp. 474-75). In the same vein, the July 2006 intervention of the Supreme 
Leader, Seyyed Ali Khamenei, in favour of privatisation was preceded by the conclusion of 
two important contracts with Bonyads and Sepah (the Revolutionary Guard) for the 
construction of Lines 6 and 7 of Tehran’s subway that amounted to a total sum of two and a 
half billion dollars. Finally, the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) is principally a market for the 
parastatal sector. Jbili, Kramarenko, and Bailen (IMF, 2004, p. 44) noted “Most listed 
companies [in TSE] are parastatal enterprises with a varying degree of direct and indirect 
government ownership” (the phrase in brackets is added). The persistence of the explicit and 
implicit SBC is one of the main features of the parastatal sector that has extended in the name 
of privatisation. 
This paper explores the SBC in the parastatal sector. The parastatal sector is a sort of 
chameleon; it is neither ‘private’ nor ‘public’ and enjoys the advantages of both state and 
private sectors. This explains why a dichotomous vision of market versus state is 
inappropriate for analysis of the prevalent SBC in the parastatal sector. Clarifying the SBC in 
this sector requires exploring the political aspects of the SBC.  
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Most SBC models postulate a benevolent (paternalist) state; only a minority assumes a 
malevolent or predatory state. However, even this minority assumes an efficient predatory 
state2 in which the Coase theorem (Coase, 1960) is applicable. But what about the parastatal 
sector in a predatory state that systematically chooses inefficient policies? Extension of the 
Coase theorem to politics precludes such a scenario (Vahabi, 2011a). However, religious and 
military foundations (Bonyads) in Iran and Milbus (military business)3 in many Middle-
Eastern and African countries exemplify the SBC in the parastatal sector under inefficient 
predatory regimes. Furthermore, even within a democratic regime, rent-seeking activity of 
public authorities is not excluded. The Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA or 
“Fannie Mae”) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC or “Freddie 
Mac”) in the U.S. are emblematic examples of the SBC in the parastatal sector under a 
democratic regime.  
In this paper, I will examine the peculiar features of the SBC in the parastatal sector, focusing 
on two examples: 1) religious and military foundations in Iran; and 2) Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac.  I will demonstrate that the SBC of the parastatal sector can be understood as 
the political economy of a predator state or rent-seeking activity. 
This result has important practical implications. Hardening of the budget constraint in the 
parastatal sector requires nationalizing parastatal assets, transparency, and democratic control 
                                                             
2 Following Buchanan, it is difficult to reconcile ‘efficiency’ with predation. The efficiency criterion is 
inapplicable in cases of coercive power: “To the extent that potential traders are coerced, either by prohibitions 
on their ability to make enforceable contracts or by the imposition of non-compensated transfers, no conclusions 
about value-maximizing resource use can be drawn because the rules permit no test” (Buchanan, 1987, p. 158). 
Although in this paper I use the term ‘efficient’ (or ‘inefficient’) predatory states in reference to the existing 
literature, I do not adhere to the theory that underpins this distinction.  
3 I adopted Siddiqa’s definition of Milbus as “military capital used for the personal benefit of the military 
fraternity, especially the office cadre, which is not recorded as part of the defence budget or does not follow the 
normal accountability procedures of the state, making it an independent genre of capital. It is either controlled by 
the military or under its implicit or explicit patronage.”  (2007, p. 5)  
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over this sector’s activity. In a symbiotic vision of the market and the state, nationalization 
might be a source of HBC. This finding mitigates one of the major predictions of the standard 
SBC literature, according to which nationalization usually works to soften the budget 
constraint. 
The remainder of this paper is organized into four main sections. Section 2 explores the 
political aspects of the SBC and demonstrates that the assumption about the nature of the state 
is fundamental in explaining the origins and persistence of the SBC. Section 3 is devoted to 
soft budget constraints in the parastatal sector under an authoritarian regime, or under a 
systematically inefficient predatory state. I will elucidate this point by analyzing religious and 
military foundations under the Islamic Republic of Iran. Section 4 focuses on the SBC of the 
parastatal sector under a democratic regime. It also discusses the sources of the SBC in 
behemoths such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in relation to the recent subprime crisis. 
Section 5 identifies the SBCs in the parastatal sector as the political economy of predatory or 
rent-seeking activity, and shows that hardening of the budget constraint might be achieved 
through nationalization. Section 6 presents conclusions.  
2. Political aspects of the SBC 
At least two conceptually separable elements are involved in the essential SBC problem: one 
is related to economic power relationships and the other is associated with political power 
relationships. The first involves the exercise of economic power due to a monopoly position 
in the market, or asymmetrical information between agents. The second refers to particular 
formal authority relationships between superiors and subordinates in a vertical or hierarchical 
structure. 
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Kornai, Maskin, and Roland (2003) highlighted the importance of adverse selection and moral 
hazards in generating soft budget constraints in both socialist and capitalist economies. 
However, asymmetrical information is not the only problem leading to the SBC. The second 
problem is a political one at the heart of the SBC syndrome; it is related to the differences in 
goals between the government and firms. Stigler’s theory of the market capture highlights the 
effects of lobbying on economic performance (Stigler, 1971).  
These two problems cannot be completely separated in reality, so in many models the SBC is 
defined both in relation to the asymmetrical information structure and the asymmetrical 
objective functions. Nevertheless, they can be conceptually separated. When considering the 
asymmetrical objective function, the nature of the government becomes crucial.  
In their analysis of the size of nations, Alesina and Spolaore (2003) distinguished between 
three different types of government. The first is a benevolent government that maximizes a 
collective utility function. Here, politicians are assumed to be ideal social planners who 
maximize social welfare. The second is a democratic government, which can be described as 
a government of free citizens who can vote for government policies and political borders. In 
economic jargon, public policies are determined by the utility function of the median elector. 
The third is a predatory government, or what the authors labelled ‘Leviathans’. Here, 
“decisions are taken by rent-maximizing governments who care about their own welfare, and 
that of their close associates, rather than the welfare of their citizens. Following a tradition 
that goes back to Thomas Hobbes (1651), we will call such governments ‘Leviathans’” (p. 
69). Because Leviathans do not follow the elective principle, they are exposed to insurrection 
threats, a point that was particularly stressed by Acemoglu and Robinson (2000). They 
interpreted the extension of voting rights to larger fractions of the population as a 
consequence of a problem of insurrections for absolute monarchs in the 19th century. 
 9 
 
Accordingly, predatory governments or Leviathans maximize their rent-seeking utility 
function under the constraint of the non-insurrection condition.  
The SBC literature excludes the democratic state but includes two other types: the benevolent 
(paternalist) and the malevolent (predatory) states. 
In the benevolent (paternalist) case, softness cannot be explained by the internal interests of 
the government, so the softness explanation would be exogenous. Three types of models may 
be grouped into this category: 1) the Kornai and Weibull (1983) model of the SBC as ex post 
bailouts; 2) the externality models (Segal, 1998; Daveri and Panunzi, 1997; Wildasin, 1997); 
and 3) the insider control model (Li, 1998).  
All these models focused on ex post bailouts or ex post state intervention. However, an ex 
ante state intervention may also lead to the SBC. If an economic unit obtains some subsidies, 
tax reliefs, preferential loans, etc. before the start of the financial period, its budget constraint 
is soft in a preliminary sense. Based on this observation, Szabó (1988) distinguished between 
the preliminary (ex ante) and the incremental (ex post) softness of a budget constraint. The 
exogenous explanation of the SBC focused on ‘incremental’ rather than ‘preliminary’ 
softness4.  
Some studies of state subsidies have rejected the paradigm of benevolent government in 
favour of a positive theory of government or a ‘malevolent’ (predatory) government 
maximizing the interests of governors under the constraint of non-insurrection. The most 
notable of these studies is Becker’s (1983) paper, which developed a theory of competition for 
subsidies among self-interested pressure groups. These groups choose the level of rent-
seeking activity, which determine transfers through an exogenously given (‘black-boxed’) 
                                                             
4 It should not be forgotten that socialist and capitalist economies include some strategic sectors or strategic 
priorities in producing some products or services, leading to a preliminary softness of budget constraint.  
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political influence function (Vahabi, 2011a). This second assumption leads to an endogenous 
explanation of the political aspect of the SBC syndrome. The Public Choice Theory develops 
this endogenous explanation of the SBC. 
The political aspect of the SBC is particularly relevant when softening of the budget 
constraint becomes a matter of strategic behaviour of the rent-seeking Leviathans. In this case, 
the ex ante SBC is as significant as the ex post SBC. Anderson (1995) noted the political 
origins of soft budget constraints in the Middle East, arguing that because of the political 
importance of non-market, concessional, or politically-motivated external financing in the 
Middle East after the Second World War, regimes in this region came to participate in the 
international system in much the same way that managers of state-owned enterprises operate 
in socialist economies. 
The importance of these political considerations regarding the relationship between states 
notwithstanding, economists have tried to capture the political element of the SBC in the 
particular relationship between the state and firms. Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny (1995, 1996) 
focused on this aspect of the SBC problem.  
In their analyses of the relationship between politicians and managers, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1993, 1994) and Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1996) illustrated the Coase theorem by 
stressing the role of corruption in raising efficiency. When side-payments in the form of 
bribes are allowed, managers and politicians choose the outcome that, from their joint 
perspective, is the most efficient. Bribes divide the surplus between managers and politicians 
according to the Nash or some other bargaining solution. In this sense, corruption can be 
compared to reputation in providing a mechanism for contract enforcement. However, as 
Shleifer (1994) argued, in transition economies the horizons of politicians are often too short 
to develop a reputation for efficient bribe-taking.  
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It should be noted that in this case, corruption is to some extent exempt from renegotiation. 
Because corruption is illegal in most societies, both the giver and the receiver of a bribe risk 
going to jail. This type of analysis of property rights as both control and cash flow rights has 
largely contributed to the understanding of some informal institutions such as corruption; it 
endogenises the political aspects of the SBC and tries to show that the inefficiency of public 
firms is related to the agency problem with politicians rather than with managers. “We believe 
that managerial discretion problems are usually minor relative to political discretion 
problems. Privatisation works because it controls political discretion” (Boycko et al., 1996, p. 
318).  
Hence, the softness of the budget constraint is a strategic choice of politicians who maximize 
a particular kind of ‘political function’, whereas managers as profit-maximizers are more 
prone to maintain a HBC. It should be stressed that in this line of analysis, although the state 
is assumed to be predatory, it is an efficient predatory state because the political Coase 
theorem is applicable (Vahabi, 2011a).  
A theory about an ‘efficient’ predatory state or a ‘Political Coase Theorem’ (PCT) has 
important practical implications with regard to privatisation. In the early phases of market 
reform during post-socialist transition, privatisation of state property had pride of place. 
Borrowing from the Coase theorem, one major argument for the rapid privatisation in Russia 
was that the achievement of initial property rights was less important than the establishment 
of property rights and free exchange. Advocates of speedy privatisation, inspired by the Coase 
theorem, were convinced that the inefficiencies and injustices in the initial stages of property 
distribution would eventually be automatically corrected as long as the market for property 
rights functioned properly. “The Coase theorem shows how efficiency can be restored, but 
only if property is protected and contracts are enforced (Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny, 1995, 
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p. 27).” After a sequence of exchanges, property rights will be reallocated to the party who 
offers the highest bid, i.e., the most efficient owner.  
Rapaczynski summarized a similar line of argument about the rapid privatisation in all post-
Soviet economies (PSE): “Governments’ intent on fostering a market economy should thus 
make sure to put an effective legal system in place, one in which property rights are 
unambiguous, secure and freely alienable. Even if the state gets some of the initial 
endowments wrong, it is often added, the Coase theorem instructs us that the parties, if free to 
contract, will correct this by appropriate private agreements” (1996, p. 89). This prediction 
has now been clearly proven false. 
State failure and a lack of market infrastructure prevented the correction of flaws in the initial 
distribution of property rights through Coaseian bargaining mechanisms. As a result, 
inefficient forms of corporate governance have persisted far longer than predicted by the 
Coase theorem.  
Table 1 identifies the nature of the state in various SBC models. 
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Table 1. Benevolent and Malevolent (predatory) states and the SBC. 
Type of SBC Cause of SBC State type Authors 
SBC ex post Paternalism Benevolent state Kornai and Weibull, 1983 
SBC ex post Externalities (too 
big to fail) 
Benevolent state Segal, 1998; Daveri and 
Panunzi, 1997; Wildasin, 
1997 
SBC ex post Insider control Benevolent state Li, 1998 
SBC ex post 
and SBC ex 
ante 
Rent-seeking Efficient predator state 
(application of the Coase 
theorem, 1960) 
Boycko et al., 1995, 
1996; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1993, 1994 
My theoretical framework assumes a predatory state, as do the endogenous models of the 
SBC. Nevertheless, I introduce two major modifications: 
1) My framework assumes that predatory states and lobbying are inefficient, because the 
Coase theorem (1960) is not applicable with regard to the relationships between the 
state and the ‘parastatal’ sector (Vahabi, 2010a, 2011a).  
2) My framework is based on a symbiosis of state and market, in which a parastatal 
sector develops. This sector has a chameleon-like character (neither public nor private 
but with the advantages of both state and private sectors). It has an indeterminate 
status, with multiple Agents and Principals pursuing contradictory objectives. 
The next section presents the peculiar features of the parastatal sector under an inefficient 
predatory state. 
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3. Parastatal sector under an authoritarian regime  
Since the 1980s, parastatal sectors have emerged in many Middle-Eastern and African 
countries. A parastatal sector has a chameleon-like character and has a SBC under an 
inefficient predatory state. Examples abound: religious and military foundations in Iran 
(Vahabi, 2010b; Mohajer and Vahabi, 2011), health and agricultural sectors in Malawi 
(Chirwa, 2002); the military sector or Milbus in Egypt, Pakistan, and Turkey (Siddiqa, 2007); 
and many other sectors throughout the Middle East (Celasun, 2001) and Tanzania (Skoog, 
2000 and Fischer, 2006). 
Kuran (2001, 2003) explored the relationship between religious foundations and Waqf within 
the Islamic system of public goods provision. Acemoglu and Robinson (2005), North (1995), 
North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009) studied the importance of the military sector under 
authoritarian or ‘natural states’. In the same vein, I identified the peculiar features of religious 
and military foundations in the Middle East and particularly focused on the Iranian Bonyads 
(Foundations) in post-revolutionary Iran, which involve the SBC (Vahabi, 2010b; Mohajer 
and Vahabi 2011). I found that property rights in the parastatal sector are indeterminate; here, 
‘indeterminate’ properties refer to booty from warfare and looting, or property confiscated 
during a revolution. Although this kind of property can be transformed into ‘public,’ 
‘personal,’ ‘private,’ ‘combinatorial,’ or other types of ownership, their initial status remains 
indeterminate. For ‘indeterminate’ properties, entitlement to property rights depends on the 
discretionary power of the coercive authority. Appropriative allocation leads to indeterminate 
property.  
Bonyads are considered ‘para-governmental’ (Saeidi, 2004), or ‘parastatal foundations’ 
(Maloney, 2000). Many Bonyads exist; the most prominent are Bonyad-e Mostazafan va 
Janbazan (BMJ, Foundation of the Oppressed and Self-Sacrificers) and Bonyad-e Shahid 
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(Martyrs’ Foundation)5.  The BMJ was set up after the confiscation of the assets of the late 
Shah and 53 industrialists exiled in the aftermath of revolution, in conformity with 
Khomeyni’s injunction that referred to these assets as ‘spoils’ and specified that ‘they must be 
kept and controlled separately from state properties’ (Saeidi, 2004, p. 484).  
The size and scope of the BMJ is similar to that of a government (New York Times, Jan. 8, 
1995). With holdings worth 12 billion U.S. dollars, the BMJ constitutes the largest non-state 
sector in the Iranian economy, second in size only to the National Iranian Oil Company6 
(Smith, 1997; Maloney, 2000). Due to complete opacity, no accurate information is available 
about Bonyad’s activities, but an economic report published by the French Embassy estimated 
that its various branches contribute 7–10% of the Iranian GDP (Ambassade de France, 
Mission Economique, 20 June 2006).  
The BMJ operates like a holding, with many enterprises extending into almost all sectors of 
the economy: mining, housing, manufacturing, trade, shipping, transportation, airline, 
tourism, agriculture, food industry and soft beverages, etc. Recently, it has been strengthening 
its position in the energy (including hydrocarbon) and communication (as the second-largest 
Iranian mobile operator, etc.) sectors. However, the institutional status of this giant holding 
has chameleon-like characteristics. It can change at will, acting as a private economy when 
buying privatised firms, but going ‘public’ to control such ‘strategic’ businesses as the 
national shipping line, enshrined in the Iranian constitution as a publicly-owned agency.  
                                                             
5 This Foundation was established a month after the 1979 revolution to support the surviving relatives of the 
martyrs and disabled veterans of the revolution and later the families of the martyrs of the eight-year war with 
Iraq. For a more detailed report, see Encyclopedia Iranica, 1987, pp. 360-61; Maloney, 2000, pp. 151-2; Saeidi, 
2004, pp. 488-490. For some recent official data regarding its activities as well as a similar Bonyad, the Imam 
Khomeyni Relief Aid Committee, see Sazman Modiryaat va Barnameh Rizi Keshvar Salnameh Amari Keshvar 
1383 (The Annual Statistics of the Country) 2004, pp. 551-2, 565-571.    
6 Saeidi (2004, p. 493) noted that the total budget of the foundations was estimated at nearly half the 
government’s national budget, 6000 billion rials, at the end of the 1980s. 
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This chameleon-like position is the result of its indeterminate property structure: it is neither 
private nor state-owned. In terms of legal status, the Foundations have been described as 
public, non-governmental organizations. This classification is somewhat paradoxical, but it 
does reflect their ‘indeterminate’ nature. With no governmental discretion over their expenses, 
no shareholders, no public accounts, and no well-defined legal status, they have been 
operating autonomously from the government. However, as professed ‘charitable’ 
organizations, they have been benefiting from tax exemptions (IMF Staff Country Report, 
1998, p. 26), preferential bank credits, subsidies, and special ‘quasi-budgetary redistribution’ 
(Coville, 2002).   
Despite the historical defence of the waqf7 (Islamic religious endowment) by the ulama, the 
Foundations as ‘charitable’ organizations are not attached to any religious institution. Of 
course, they are absolutely loyal to the supreme leader and to local religious leaders who act 
as their representatives, but they are unconnected to the clerical Shiite hierarchy and the 
traditional religious networks: “the Bonyad-e Mostazafan operates, for all intents and 
purposes, outside the scope of both the traditional religious power structure and the 
government” (Maloney, 2000, p. 157). The waqf continue to command vast amounts of 
resources in the Islamic Republic; and the Bonyad-e Astan-e Qods, which manages the 
endowments related to the shrine of Imam Reza at Mashhad, owns property all over the 
country8. In contrast to the Shah’s regime, the Islamic Republic has guaranteed the 
independence of waqf from the government; but the Foundations maintain their autonomy 
from both the government and the traditional religious hierarchy. 
                                                             
7 For an analysis of Waqf as a credible commitment device to give property owners economic security in return 
for social services, see Kuran (2001). 
8 For a historical account of Astan-e Qods-e Razawi, see Mawlawi, Mostafawi, and Sakuurzada, 1987, pp. 826-
837. 
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What are these Foundations, and to whom do they belong? They own ‘confiscated’ properties 
(‘spoils’ in Khomeini’s terminology) that could have been transformed into private or state 
properties, but were not. Contrary to the dominant view, the state sector in post-revolutionary 
Iran does not resemble the omnipresent state of the USSR. It would be easy to compare Iran 
to post-Soviet Russia, where the dismantling of an entrenched system of power and the 
concomitant rise of new political and financial magnates (powerful transitory ‘financial-
industrial groups’) empowered an array of puissant clientelist networks, but unlike their 
Russian counterparts, the Iranian Foundations have not transformed into private monopolies.  
Their permanent position as an ‘indeterminate’ form of property is a result of the extension of 
parallel institutions even into the Iranian economy under the Islamic Republic. “These 
organizations represent the dual power structure in Iran which reinforces the financial 
authority of religious leaders without accountability” (Saeidi, 2004, p. 479). They constitute 
the authoritative resources of theocrat leaders: they favour and empower the parallel military 
and paramilitary groups belonging to theocrats, and enrich the military and religious elites, 
and thence reproduce the authority of the Supreme Leader and theocrats (Mohajer and 
Vahabi, 2011). They enjoy an almost unconstrained capacity of intervention in the Iranian 
economy and in political competition between different factions, and may be described as ‘a 
state within a state’ (Scheuer, 1994).  
In the presence of oil resource wealth, a weakened state, less foreign aid, and pressure for 
economic liberalization, religious and military elites found it optimal to deinstitutionalize the 
state and formal bureaucratic mechanisms in favour of a parallel “shadow state” under their 
own control. Parastatal sector is the result of this deinstitutionalization of the state and its 
SBC stems from the predatory activities of elite groups on the state resources  
 18 
 
The close relationship between the BMJ and the Iranian security apparatus and its institutional 
authority was confirmed by the appointment of Mohsen Refiqdust, the former commander of 
the Revolutionary Guard (Sepah), to lead the Foundation in 1989. Due to non-accountability 
and total opacity with regard to its activities, widespread corruption in the BMJ and its diverse 
branches involving Refiqdust’s brothers and many other directors led Refiqdust’s replacement 
by former Defence Minister Mohammad Foruzandeh in July 1999 (see The Economist, Sep 
25, 1993; The New York Times, Jan 8, 1995; Financial Times, Jul 17, 1997; Saeidi, 2004, pp. 
495-98).  
When Foruzandeh took up his post, he announced that 80% of its 350 companies were losing 
money. However, the state bailed out all of these enterprises. This ex post SBC was 
complementary to the ex ante SBC that had benefited the Bonyads. The colossal sum of the ex 
ante SBC was mainly guaranteed through bank credits, preferential exchange rate for U.S. 
dollars, and tax and custom tariffs exemptions.    
During Refiqdust’s direction, the organizational connections between the Revolutionary 
Guard and the BMJ developed substantial involvement in weapons procurement and 
production. For example, “the Bonyad’s heavy presence in legitimate mining and chemicals 
production allegedly camouflage IRGC [the Revolutionary Guard] chemical weaponry plants. 
In addition, German intelligence sources contend that the MJF [Bonyad] has utilized a 
network of sham enterprises to acquire inputs for the Revolutionary Guard’s defence industry 
(...) In addition, the foundation apparently undertakes international endeavours that transgress 
the traditional definition of trade - the MJF is commonly cited as a generous supporter and 
active political patron of the Lebanese terrorist organization” (Maloney, 2000, pp. 159-160). 
Close examination of the Foundations in Iran reveals that they promote ‘destructive creation’ 
which is the exact opposite of Schumpeter’s ‘creative destruction’. Schumpeter (1951, 
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Chapter VII) referred to the process of capitalist development as ‘creative destruction,’ 
meaning the destruction of old products, past processes of manufacturing, and archaic forms 
of organization through the introduction of new products, ways of producing, and 
organizational methods. Destructive creation is the opposite of ‘creative destruction,’ and 
refers to the production of destructive means and the necessary infrastructure and skills 
related to such means so that authoritative resources and relationships can be reproduced.  
The main characteristics of the parastatal sector, which is permeated by the SBC, can be 
summarized by five features: 
1) Property rights are indeterminate, which allows the development of personal 
ownership of the assets by predators, particularly the religious and military elites. 
2) Parallel institutions, a fragmented political order, or a situation of a ‘state within state’ 
constitute the sine qua non political condition for the development of this sector. 
3) The multiplicity of Agents and Principals results in opacity with regard to the identity 
of decision-makers concerning the disposal of parastatal assets.  
4) This sector is based on the inseparable character of politics and economics under an 
authoritarian regime. 
5) Enhancement of this sector is closely associated with the populist quasi-budgetary 
policies of revenue redistribution that aim to attract support from marginal and 
deprived layers of the population. 
In summary, the parastatal sector is contradictory to the impersonal rights of all citizens. It is 
a major impediment to the development of a genuine private sector as well as to the 
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institutions of a welfare state such as social security.  The SBC of parastatal sector is the 
outcome of the political economy of an inefficient predatory state. 
4. Parastatal sector under a democratic regime 
According to Kornai (1993), the SBC is closely related to the predominance of state property, 
whereas private property has a natural affinity to HBC. Capitalism is considered to be the 
counter example of the SBC.  
In contrast to this vision, the American model of capitalism, with its enduring New Deal 
institutions, is replete with examples of the SBC. The institutions in question are neither 
purely private nor wholly public. They are, rather, hybrids, even chameleons: “private 
economic activities supported, leveraged, guaranteed, and regulated by public power; public 
institutions aided, abetted, and buttressed by private money. They are elements of an 
American social welfare state but dressed up, in characteristically American fashion, in the 
guise of a market system” (Galbraith, 2009, p. 104).  
Galbraith estimated that these institutions in health care, higher education, housing, and social 
security together compose nearly 40% of the total consumption of goods and services in the 
United States. Taking into account the state’s intervention in the military, agricultural, and 
other sectors, the government is responsible for more than half the state’s economic activity.  
In other words, the market and the state are intertwined even in the so-called neo-liberal 
model of capitalism. The main issue is how the prevalent SBC in these sectors is run and to 
what extent the private sector is taking advantage of it. 
For Galbraith, these sectors are run by a ‘Corporate Republic,’ which is a predator state. 
Although this assessment is controversial, the parastatal sector or what is commonly called 
‘Government Sponsored Enterprises’ (GSE) played an undeniable role in the recent subprime 
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crisis. Congleton (2009) particularly highlighted the roles played by the Federal National 
Mortgage Association (FNMA or ‘Fannie Mae’) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage 
Corporation (FHLMC or ‘Freddie Mac’) in the financial crisis. 
After initial periods of federal support, all of these government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) 
became more or less private entities. None had formal backing from the U.S. Government, 
although they were partly managed through government appointees and subjected to different 
forms of government oversight than other financial firms.  
 
According to Congleton (2009, p. 291), “Most investors consequently believed that, if need 
be, U.S. taxpayers would back up the GSEs after they were “privatised,” which proved to be 
correct in September 2008. The implicit backing of taxpayers allowed the FHLB, Fannie Mae, 
and Freddie Mac to borrow money at rates lower than other banks (about 0.4% less, according 
to Congressional Budget Office estimates). The GSEs also faced somewhat different 
regulatory constraints than ordinary investment banks. They were, for example, exempt from 
most state taxes and regulations, which provided an implicit subsidy of approximately a 
billion dollars. These implicit subsidies to housing were not on the federal government’s 
balance sheets, nor were the risks associated with the implicit guarantees of the federal 
government” (emphasis added).  
 
These institutions largely benefited from huge amounts of implicit subsidies or what Kornai 
dubbed the ex ante SBC before the crisis. According to Crippen (2001), the value of the 
implicit subsidies between 1995 and 2000 varied from $6.8 to $15.6 billion. Fannie and 
Freddie remained major players in the mortgage market even as they approached bankruptcy 
in 2007–2008. As expected, they were bailed out in the summer of 2008. The newly created 
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Federal Housing Finance Agency reported that “as of June 2008, the combined debt and 
(MBS) obligations of these GSEs totalled $6.6 trillion, exceeding the total publicly held debt 
of the U.S. [government] by $1.3 trillion. The GSEs also purchased or guaranteed 84% of new 
mortgages”9. They were also the beneficiaries of the ex post SBC.  
 
Analysis of the origins of the ex ante and ex post SBC in this sector reveals the political 
economy of the recent financial crisis. In fact, the SBC can be explained by a trilateral 
consensus among regulators (politicians), interest groups, or lobbyists, particularly the senior 
managers at Fannie and Freddie and median voters.  
 
A) Regulators or politicians  
 
Following the 1992 law regarding ‘affordable housing,’ the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD) was placed in charge of the GSEs. HUD encouraged the 
extension of loans to ‘underserved areas’ and for ‘low- and moderate-income housing.’ 
Accordingly, both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac increased their loans and created a new 
market in ‘sub-prime’ (e.g., sub-standard) mortgages and mortgage-backed securities. This 
policy was implemented under both Presidents Clinton and George W. Bush for a simple 
reason: they could subsidise housing without the need for additional congressional approval 
or funds. Regulators or politicians could gain more votes from American citizens (median 
electors) by allowing them to realize their dream of being a homeowner, without facing any 
formal responsibility in front of the Senate or Congress regarding how loans were provided. 
The ‘off-budget’ character of this parastatal channel of financing the housing was the source 
                                                             
9 Source: www.fhfa.gov/Default.aspx?Page₌4  
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of its softness. To put it another way, the parastatal sector could be used as an informal 
institution to avoid the restrictions and regulations of formal institutions such as the Senate 
and Congress. 
 
B) Interest groups or lobbyists 
 
The corporate governance of Fannie and Freddie reveals the inseparability of politics and 
economics in the way they are run. The President of the United States selects about a third of 
their boards of directors (5 of 17 for Fannie Mae and 5 of 18 for Freddie Mac); the rest are 
elected by stockholders. Among the most prominent lobbyists are the GSEs themselves and 
organizations representing commercial banks and realtor groups.  
 
Until recently, the standing regulator of Fannie and Freddie, the Office of Federal Housing 
Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO, a department of HUD) was significantly politicized and 
deprived of sufficient ability to ensure efficient control. The politicized character of the 
regulator contributed to the lack of transparency and non-controllability of senior directors of 
Fannie and Freddie. According to a report published by the Washington Post, several high-
paid top officials of Fannie Mae, including its CEO, were ‘encouraged’ to resign as a 
consequence of the OFHEO and the SEC investigations. The SEC and OFHEO subsequently 
fined Fannie Mae $400 million in 2006 for manipulating its accounts from 1998–2002 to 
enrich its senior management (Day, 2006).  
 
C) Median voters or American citizens 
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Home ownership is the major form of wealth accumulation for American citizens or median 
voters. Kennickell (2006, Table 11a) estimated that about two-thirds of the net wealth owned 
by Americans in the lowest 95% of the wealth distribution was home equity. Before the 
housing bubble burst in 2006-2007, the median voter (who is a home owner) was not 
interested in knowing how the subprime market was eased by Fannie and Freddie and how 
dangerous the consequences could be in case of a financial crisis. There was not much 
concern about the lack of control and transparency of ‘off budget’ channels financing the 
housing sector. This trilateral consensus was terminated with the burst of the housing bubble 
and the subprime crisis.  
 
5. SBC and political economy of rent-seeking activity  
 
In the preceding sections, I discussed the SBC in the parastatal sector under both authoritarian 
and democratic regimes. How do these cases diverge and what are their commonalities? 
The two cases differed in three main ways.  
First, the existence (or absence) of a state of law or a Weberian state that has monopoly over 
violence is a crucial difference between the two cases. The parastatal sector (Foundations) in 
Iran developed under Velayat-e-Faqih10 and not a Weberian state. Its very existence can be 
understood as an authoritarian resource for the domination of Shiite clergy and their military 
apparatus (Sepah or the Guardian of Revolution). The parastatal sector under a predatory state 
                                                             
10 The institution of Velayat-e-faqih or guardianship of the jurisconsult is Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s legacy 
to Shiite political theory and praxis. “The jurisconsult, or supreme leader, is a highly esteemed cleric chosen by 
his peers on the eighty-six-member Assembly of Experts in recognition of his knowledge of fiqh, or Islamic 
jurisprudence, and his other religiopolitical credentials. The Supreme Leader’s role is to guide Iranians (and, in 
theory, other Muslims) toward the just government of God. His powers are wide ranging. He is the Commander-
in-chief of Iran’s armed forces, may veto the President’s decisions, and is charged with protecting the 
government’s Islamic character” (Bakhtiari, 2005, p. 114). 
 25 
 
is a ‘state in a state,’ run by elite groups who have access to coercive means. This sector is not 
subject to any law, because the formal state cannot credibly commit itself to enforce the law 
on violent enforcers.  
Fannie and Freddie are institutions that developed under a state of law. A state of law does not 
accept political privileges for elite groups that are not universal. Thus, the autonomy of 
‘politics’ and ‘economics’ is acknowledged with regard to the universality or impersonality of 
rights for every citizen (North, Wallis and Weingast, 2009). In fact, increased political 
accountability, at least in the short run, may induce politicians to choose less transparent 
instruments to maintain public support. The ‘off-budget’ practices under a democratic regime 
reflect this type of implicit or concealed SBC. Desai and Olofsgard (2006, p. 385) 
demonstrated that “democratic transitions can also expand the proportion of implicit subsidies 
in the total”. Conversely, in an authoritarian or theocratic regime, the political privileges of 
elite groups (particularly the clergy and army) are translated in terms of economic privileges 
and explicit SBC.  
The second distinction is related to the use of coercive means. The parastatal sector under a 
predator state increases the extent of military penetration into society and economy. 
Foundations (Bonyads) and Milbus develop profit-making through the privatisation of 
security. The members of other elite groups in the country accommodate the military’s 
interests for mutual benefit. This is a case of collective over-plundering, a concept that can be 
explained better using Mancur Olson’s theoretical framework of stationary and roving bandits 
(Olson, 2000). By engaging in collective over-plundering, the roving bandits impose negative 
externalities on the society, resulting in a depletion of resources. This will reduce in fine the 
share for bandits themselves.  
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Stationary bandits eschew this scenario by protecting society against roving bandits in return 
for economic gains. The military and civil elites come to terms through negotiations for 
mutual interests. However, this leads to an extension of military power in economic and social 
spheres. Examples of this kind of coalition abound11. The parastatal sectors under democratic 
regimes do not promote the extent of military sector in society and economy.  
Third, parastatal sectors under authoritarian regimes include almost every type of activity, 
regardless of size. Foundations are giant holdings that own small, medium, and large 
enterprises in almost every branch of economy from the food industry to petroleum, cell 
phones, and the automotive industry. In contrast with this vast and multi-sectoral penetration, 
the parastatal sector under democratic regimes is justified in the case of large economies of 
scale that are ‘too big to fail’ (Stern and Feldman, 2004; Mishkin, 2006).  
This is not to claim that under democratic regimes, the SBC and its associated inefficiencies 
derive from the indivisibilities or externalities (‘too big to fail’). Demsetz (2011) correctly 
noted that the only source of inefficiency in the presence of indivisible goods and services is 
the strategic behaviour of agents (free-riding). My point is that the parastatal sector under a 
democratic regime has an economic rationale, notably large negative externalities in terms of 
social impact. Under an authoritarian regime, the existence of this sector obeys a political 
rationale.   
These major divergences notwithstanding, the SBC in parastatal sectors under both 
democratic and authoritarian regimes arises from at least three common sources. 
First, parastatal sectors under both types of political regimes enjoy both forms of SBC, 
namely ex ante and ex post SBC.   
                                                             
11 See Saddiqa (2007) for a discussion of Milbus in Pakistan and other Middle Eastern countries. 
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Second, parastatal assets have an indeterminate status and a chameleon-like position between 
‘state’ and ‘private’ sectors. The inseparability of politics and economics provoke 
asymmetrical objective functions between principals and agents. Political considerations often 
override economic efficiency maximization. To put it differently, the political ingredient of 
the SBC prevails. 
Third, parastatal sectors promote parallel institutions, particularly formal and informal ones. 
Even under a state of law, group interests and lobbies can develop a coalition of ‘private’ 
businesses and ‘public’ officials as described in Stigler’s capture theory (1971). The parastatal 
sector blurs the frontiers between ‘private’ and ‘public’ to a greater extent. It provides fertile 
soil for the emergence of informal institutions due to the multiplicity of agents and principals 
with asymmetrical objective functions. When multiple principals are involved, it becomes 
difficult to identify who decides what. The ‘off budget’ procedures in the cases of Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac are good examples. The emergence of eminence grise is one result of 
informal institutions. While formal procedures and legal rules require transparency and 
accountability, informal rules and institutions encourage opacity and non-accountability. The 
lack of controllability is also strengthened by the politicized character of regulatory bodies 
that are in charge of GSEs. 
In sum, the SBC in the parastatal sector reflects the political economy of an inefficient 
predatory state or rent-seeking activity within a democratic regime. How then can the budget 
constraint be hardened in this sector?  
This issue requires analyzing the source of the softness. To date there is no consensus on 
which factors are responsible for the prevalence of soft budgets. As noted earlier, the SBC 
problem involves two aspects: economic and political. Exogenous and endogenous theories of 
the SBC that focus on the economic aspect usually recommend ‘privatisation and 
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decentralization’. Because the prevalence of soft budgets is attributed to government 
ownership, the HBC is related to a competitive decentralized private sector.  
A second approach highlights the political aspect and considers the ‘policy burden’ (for 
example, maintaining employment) to be the main source of SBC (Lin, Cai and Li, 1998; 
Robinson and Torvik, 2006). The policy burden hypothesis predicts that privatisation will not 
eliminate the SBC problem if legacies of pre-reform policies are maintained. For instance, if 
enterprises are supposed to maintain full employment and provide other social security 
requirements, then the SBC will not be overcome by privatisation (Li, 2008).  
Because the main source of the SBC in the parastatal sector is political, privatisation is not a 
solution for hardening the budget constraint in this sector. Analysis of the parastatal sector 
under an authoritarian regime reveals that nationalization of this sector is a first step toward 
defining property rights and clarifying the identities of Principal and Agent. This initial phase 
of nationalization contributes to transparency and monitoring of the parastatal sector without 
which no genuine privatisation can be carried out.  
The state sector is more prone to the SBC compared with a decentralized competitive market, 
but it might be subject to a harder budget constraint in comparison with the parastatal sector.  
Two radical reforms are required to transform the parastatal sector under an authoritarian or a 
theocratic regime: 
1) Establishment of a state of law, separation of state and religion, and democratization 
of political life so that a predatory state can be dismantled or controlled. It should be 
emphasized that in regions like the Middle East in which religion and politics are not 
separated, religious foundations have a strong economic basis. Secularism is not only 
a political reform but also a major economic reform. 
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2) Nationalization of the parastatal sector so that property rights can be clearly defined. 
The hardening of the budget constraint requires the nationalization of parastatal assets, 
transparency, and democratic control over activity in this sector.   
Following the subprime crisis, hardening of the budget constraint warranted the 
nationalization of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Although the presence of a state of law 
controls a state’s predatory tendencies, the inseparability of politics and economics, the 
indeterminate character of property rights, the dual (formal and informal) structure of 
decision-making in the parastatal sector still lead to opacity and non-accountability. In the 
presence of a politicized regulator, strong lobbies, ‘off budget’ practices of public authorities, 
and a lack of appropriate bankruptcy procedures, nationalization of this sector has become the 
only panacea. The implicit insurance of Fannie and Freddie through off-budget guarantees 
without much oversight or review has already cost U.S. taxpayers more than one trillion 
dollars.    
I fully concur with Congleton (2009, p. 297 ) that: “the Congress needs to create a GSE 
regulator with authority on a par with that of banking regulators, with a free hand to set 
appropriate capital standards, and with a clear process sanctioned by the Congress for placing 
a GSE in receivership.” This regulator should be depoliticized. 
 
6. Conclusions 
Development studies would gain a broad conceptual framework by acknowledging the 
relevance of soft budget constraints to macroeconomic stabilization, structural adjustment, 
and privatisation in developing countries. Understanding the political ingredient of the SBC 
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may enable us to derive a set of conditions necessary for the sustainability and success of 
fundamental economic reforms.  
By critiquing the dichotomous vision of exogenous and endogenous theories of the SBC, I 
explored the parastatal sector within an alternative theoretical framework based on a 
symbiosis of market and state.  
My analysis produced two main findings. First, the SBC of the parastatal sector can be 
expressed as the political economy of a predator state or state’s rent-seeking activity. Second, 
the dichotomy of SBC (related to state sector) versus private sector (associated with HBC) 
should be blurred. The budget constraint might be hardened through nationalization under 
specific circumstances.  
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